Ep 16 — The Philosophy of Prophethood

Session 14: The Philosophy of Prophethood. delivered Wednesday, 10 Mehr 1353 / 15 Ramadan al-Mubarak 1394 Surat al-Jumu'ah (62:2-3). He it is who raised up among the unlettered a Messenger from among themselves, who recites to them His verses, purifies them, and teaches them the Book and wisdom — though before that they had been in manifest error — and [He raised him] also for others among them who have not yet joined them. He is the Mighty, the Wise. Today, God willing, we take up from the Qur'an a discussion about prophethood. As you can see in these notes that are in your hands, and as you will see — or have already seen — in the text, we have set before ourselves several topics in the field of prophethood, so that, relying upon and seeking help from the blessed verses of the Qur'an, we may, God willing, come to understand these several discussions. The brothers of course know that prophethood is one of the principles of all religions. If it can be called a principle among the principles of religion — indeed, one must say something higher than that. When I said "if it can be called a principle among the principles of religion," I did not mean that anyone would deny its being a principle. No; it is something higher than a principle: religion has no meaning at all without belief in prophethood. Religion means that program, that path, that school, that creed which has come by way of a messenger from God the Exalted. So the coming of a messenger, and a coming from the side of God, is among the essential elements of religion; the very subsistence of religion rests upon it. That is why prophethood deserves our discussion as one of the important and fundamental matters of religion. Of course, in the field of prophethood there is a series of discussions that are common and customary. Pick up any book that has been written about prophethood and look at it: you will see these discussions in it. Out of all those discussions usually raised in the books about prophethood, we have taken up just one — only one of them — and that too with a particular taste, in this series of our discussions about prophethood. And that is precisely our discussion today, which is the subject of today's recitation. The rest of the discussions conducted in the field of prophethood, about prophethood, around prophethood, in the various books of theology (kalam), are in their own place correct points — indeed necessary points. But being correct does not mean that I too must be compelled, at this time, under these circumstances, with these needs, to raise that correct point here. Many of the points scholars make are correct. And here, for a few words, what I am saying is a general teaching regarding all our intellectual and research work: among the correct things, we must see which is necessary; among the necessary things, which is more necessary; among the more necessary, which is urgent; among the urgent, which is pressing and vital. We should take up that first; once we are free of it, we move on to the later discussions in this same order, until at the end of the work we come to discussions that, although correct, do not feel necessary or urgent to that same degree. Concerning the discussion of prophethood: it is true that the question of how much divine knowledge or human knowledge a prophet possesses is itself a discussion; or the question of knowing whether our Prophet — who did not write and did not read, as the speaking Qur'an states: And you did not write any book with your right hand, otherwise the falsifiers would surely have fallen into doubt. The Prophet neither wrote nor read. Was it that he did not write and did not read because he was unable to? That is, in the ordinary expression of today, was he entirely illiterate? Or rather, was he able, and yet did not write and did not read? Well, it is a discussion, after all. Or the question of which religion, which creed, among the religions and creeds of the world, the Prophet of Islam believed in and practiced before his prophethood and his Bi'thah — of course it is a discussion, but how necessary is this discussion for us? How necessary for us is the discussion before it? How necessary for us is the discussion before that one? It is not necessary at all. Of course, once a person has learned everything related to prophethood and to religion, there is no harm in his coming, at the end of the work, to understand which religion the Prophet adhered to before the Bi'thah. But we are still in the bend of a single alley. Our society still does not know the meaning of prophethood, the meaning of the Bi'thah, the aim of the Bi'thah, the outcome and conclusion of the Bi'thah, the path of the Bi'thah, and the watchword of prophethood; it does not even know that it is afflicted with this condition. The Muslim does not know the aim of the Muhammadan Bi'thah — that is why his affairs are the way they are. If he knew the aim of his Prophet's Bi'thah, he would go after that aim. We are still in the first matters, the preliminary matters, the fundamental matters in the field of prophethood. And are we to grasp at the secondary matters, those of the fourth and fifth degree? That is why, in our discussion of prophethood, we do not raise any of those discussions which the theologians have conducted and continue to conduct in their books. Here are you, and here are those books that the theologians wrote — go and read them. We have no doubt about the necessity of those discussions, nor about their goodness. But we have just as little doubt that their necessity is by far less than the necessity of many other discussions that ought to be raised today. That is why we do not discuss them. The first matter that we discuss concerning prophethood is the philosophy of prophethood. Why must there be a prophet? Why must someone, from the side of the Lord, gird himself to guide humankind? Can man himself not do it? Are human knowledge and human thought not sufficient? Why a prophet? Why a messenger between the unseen (ghayb) and the witnessed (shuhud)? This is a question that we must know. If we do not know the philosophy of prophethood, the rest of the discussions about prophethood will be left almost suspended in mid-air. So first we must know: prophethood for what? This is our first discussion today. In these notes that I wrote, which are in the gentlemen's hands, we have set this question down briefly, in a few sentences, very concisely, and the verses we recite today bear upon it. Concerning the philosophy of prophethood we will not speak much; it comes down to one word: the senses of man, the instincts of man, and the intellect of man all fall short of guiding man and taking him by the hand. One word. A series of creatures can be managed by their senses. Some animals we perhaps know to be of this sort, that they draw only upon their own senses — the outward senses. Most kinds of animals draw on their instincts in order to be guided; that is, the honeybee's instinct tells it: go and alight upon the flower, upon the fragrant flower, and suck from its perfume and its essence; then go to the house, the hive; build the houses in that six-cornered, hexagonal form; and there, with certain arrangements, enter the houses and exit; and have a queen and helpers and guards — in short, a bee civilization. If you imagine that one day the bees sat down together and a great conference of the chiefs of the bees of the hives or regions was convened, and they said, "How is it better for us to build the house?" — one said octagonal, one said square, one said hexagonal; then they studied it and saw, no, the hexagonal is more suitable — if you imagine it happened this way, I must say you have made a mistake. No such situation occurred. And your Lord revealed to the honeybee: Take houses for yourselves in the mountains, and in the trees, and in what they build as trellises. Then eat of all the fruits, and tread the paths of your Lord, in humble obedience. This is divine revelation (wahy) to the bee. The divine revelation to the bee does not mean that the bee sits down and Gabriel descends upon it; the bee's structure is like this, the bee's instinct is like this — there is an instinctual pull that draws the bee, compels it; it cannot do otherwise. Naturally and instinctually the bee is compelled, it is fashioned to build the house, to build it in this form, to find flower and plant from such-and-such a place and suck from them. If a bee were to deviate — if instead of flower and plant it were to smell and suck foul-smelling and rotten plants — they would behead it right there at the entrance of the hive. All this is their nature (fitrah) and their instinct. Instinct suffices for the bee. This gentleman Maurice Maeterlinck sat for years and reflected on the life of bees and ants and termites; he sat and studied it. This very termite about which you complain so much — it has a certain arrangement inside those ceilings of yours; in your usurped house it has built an organized structure. You are not content for it to settle on the beam of your house and build a house there — it is usurped — but in this usurped house it does its work. It builds a house, in a particular shape, in a particular order. And here is the strange thing. Suppose you could find one of the houses of the termites, or a hive of the honeybees, from the time of Noah's flood, for example, or ten centuries before Noah's flood, and place it beside one of the hives in one of the pleasant, fine-aired highlands of the Mashhad of this present time. You would see that, to the breadth of a needle's point, this hive does not differ from that hive in its arrangements. Evolution, advancement, progress — these do not exist in the work of the honeybee, nor in the work of any other animal. What does exist is the revelation of nature, the revelation of the instincts, and the guidance of the quality of its creation and formation, which draws it, moves it, shows it the way, points out the obstacles to it, until it is able to do its own work. There is nothing other than instinct. Man too uses instinct, but little. When you first came into the world, your state — with all due distinction — was the state of one of these very animals. It was by instinct, by the pull of nature (fitrah) and disposition, that you were able to find the store of your food in your mother's breast, and when they placed it in your mouth, to suck. No one had taught you to suck; you had not learned its practical, auditory, and visual instructions somewhere — this was your instinct. As you rose from the stage of childhood, gradually this tool, this eyeglass, this weapon whose name is instinct grew weak, became ineffective, became of little use. In its place came something more effective, stronger, more powerful — the reason and intellect ('aql wa khirad) of man — and you became a reasoning being. You no longer work by instinct now; it is not instinct that tells you, "Sir, go and open your shop, or close it at such-and-such an hour, or answer the customer this way, or study the lesson this way, or teach in that manner" — these are not instinct, these are instructions that you took up from thought and from knowledge, learned, and found your way of life. But does this intellect, this human thought, suffice to guide you and bring you to the destination of felicity? Is human reason adequate to guide him? Reason itself, if it is open, if it thinks, if it does not become bigoted, if it wishes to judge without ulterior motive, will say no — like a court that gives its own verdict that it has no jurisdiction over itself, a court that rules, "I have no competence to judge in this case." Sound human reason, free of ulterior motive, judges that "I am not competent to guide humanity independently." You want proof? We have two kinds of proof. One proof is that human reason is limited, not infinite, whereas the needs of human beings are infinite. How can a single intellect understand all the needs, so that, in the face of those needs, it might supply what would fill the place of those needs, or might enact a law? Human reason cannot do this work; it is too weak, too incapable, too inadequate to recognize all the pains and to provide the appropriate remedy for all of them. For the other proof, look at the historical and scientific realities. See, were the intellects able? Were intellects such as the intellect of Aristotle and Plato and Socrates able to manage humankind? Plato the thinker sits and thinks, consults, studies, researches, and sketches an ideal city (a utopia). Yet this ideal city is good only for the mind and the inner strongbox of the honorable Plato himself, because not for a single moment, anywhere in the world, was it ever put into practice. And if you look today at Plato's ideal city, with the arrangements of the world of the present time, it appears to you as something unacceptable and ridiculous. Look at the rational and philosophical schools, how they array themselves one against the other. See that humanity, unless it is connected to a source and a point higher, loftier, and deeper than human reason, cannot reach the way to guidance and felicity. This is the meaning of prophethood: man needs a force higher, a guidance stronger and deeper than the guidance of the senses, than the guidance of instinct, than the guidance of reason. This guidance comes — and what does it do? Does it come to compete with your senses? Does it come to oppose your instinct? Does it come to dash the head of reason against a stone? Never. It comes to guide reason, to nurture reason, to bring the buried reason out from beneath the tons of dust. Our Commander of the Faithful, may God's blessings and peace be upon him — I misspoke — the Commander of the Faithful of all humanity (let us not confine the Commander of the Faithful to ourselves); he is the teacher of humanity, the Commander of the Faithful is the great one of humanity. According to what is in the Nahj al-Balaghah, he says that God sent the prophets so that they might urge human beings to remain faithful to the covenant and pledge of their nature (fitrah), and might bring to their remembrance the forgotten blessings, and then "they might unearth for them the buried treasures of the intellects" (wa yuthiru lahum dafa'in al-'uqul). The prophets come to bring out these buried treasures, to stir up these buried intellects: the intellects, the reasons, the understandings, the consciousnesses of the human societies that had been buried by the Pharaohs and the Nimrods and the great ones and the powerful. Pharaoh does not like the people to possess intellect; he does not like human beings to understand — because if they understand, his existence will become void and a fable, which we will see explained in the later discussions of prophethood, God willing. Pharaoh does not like the people to employ the force of intellect; because this is so, he buries the force of intellect. How he buries it is a matter for the later discussions, God willing. The prophets come to extract these buried treasures, these hoards, these hidden and concealed treasures; they refine them, and they place them in the people's hands. So the prophets, with the force of revelation that they have, do not go to war against reason. The one who imagines that religion is at variance with reason either does not know religion or has no reason. By contrast, one who possesses reason — one who has tested and tried reason and also knows religion — knows well that religion cannot, and does not, have any variance whatsoever with human knowledge and human reason. None at all. What religion says, sound intellects understand and approve. Those ignorant people who, in the name of defending religion, sometimes say, "Sir, you must not seek the rationale of religion; you must not seek argumentation in religion; you must not seek philosophy in the matter of religion" — they imagine that this saying (seeking philosophy, asking for philosophy) diminishes the worth of religion. They must know that this is not the case at all. Sound religion, when it is presented before the complete intellect, has no variance and no conflict with it whatsoever. Today the great intellects of humanity understand the tawhid of religion, the prophethood of religion, the prayer of religion, the fasting of religion, the zakat of religion, the secondary rulings of religion. When the human intellect and the experience of human knowledge recognizes alcohol, knows the harms of alcohol, understands its blow and injury to the body, to the nerves, to the spirit, and to the general condition of society — why should I not be able and not have the courage to recite the verse of the Qur'an with power? Indeed, wine, gambling, idols, and divining-arrows are an abomination from the work of Satan, so avoid it. Why should I not raise the verse of the Qur'an? Why should I not appeal to what human knowledge has understood in this field? Why should I not say that it is from the work of Satan — that is, it is the satans who give this to you, and it is the satans who profit from the drinking of that wretched drinker? Why should we not say this? That which you have heard that Imam al-Sajjad, may God's blessings and peace be upon him, said — "The religion of God is not attained by the intellects" (din Allah la yusabu bi-l-'uqul) — its meaning is something else. That is, the divine creed cannot be discovered by reason. What does "cannot be discovered" mean? It means that if you have no narration (riwayah) telling you that the noon prayer is four cycles, you cannot understand by reason that the noon prayer is four cycles — and this is a very correct point too. If the Qur'an itself does not state the time of prayer: Establish the prayer from the declining of the sun until the darkness of the night, and the Qur'an of dawn (the dawn prayer and its supererogatory prayer). If the Qur'an does not state this, you cannot understand by way of reason and thought and ordinary intellect when the time of prayer is. The Qur'an must state this; the hadith must state this; revelation must state this to us. This is what Imam al-Sajjad means; the outward of his statement too is just this — "The religion of God is not attained by the intellects." Its meaning is not that we cannot see the rulings of religion and the teachings of religion with the vision of reason and with the eyeglass of reason and human intellect — such that a group of ignorant people, in the name of defending religion, with fervor, with heat, cry out, "Sir, do not set forth a philosophy for religion!" Why should we not? Why should we not set it forth? Of course we always say, we repeat, we confess, that what we understand is not a thousandth of the deep teachings of religion; what we can apply and explain is far less than what may in reality be done and exist — there is no doubt in this. But I say one word, the next person says one word, the person after him says one word. Along the lengthwise line of human history, when you reckon, after two hundred years, five hundred years, you see that humanity, humankind, is far more believing, more confessing, more acknowledging of the depth of religion than in the age when these thoughts and these reflections and these applications had not yet come to it. Therefore religion, when it comes, does not come to crush reason, does not come to abrogate reason and drive reason out of life. So for what does religion come? It comes to guide reason, to take the hand of reason. Reason exists, but when caprice is beside it, it cannot judge correctly. Reason exists, but when greed is shoulder to shoulder with it, it cannot see correctly. When ulterior motive is beside it, it cannot understand correctly. Religion comes to take away from reason the caprices, the whims, the greeds, the fears, the ulterior motives; it strengthens the sound, complete reason, confirms it, so that it may understand well. And when you turn to Islam, you see that Islam, from beginning to end, is full of the manifestations of reason. In the Qur'an how much we have: "Will you not reason?" (a-fa-la ta'qilun); how much we have: "Will you not reflect?" (a-fa-la tatafakkarun); how much we have — so that you may understand, so that you may know — how much we have: "Indeed in that are signs for those endowed with understanding" (inna fi dhalika la-ayatin li-uli l-albab) — for the people of reason. In the narrations how much we have: "Indeed God has two proofs over the people" (inna li-Llahi 'ala l-nasi hujjatayn) — God has two proofs over the people: one the prophet and one the reason. And again reason. About reason we will not speak more than this now. In sum, keep this one word in mind. Without the guidance of revelation, without revelation coming to him and coming to his aid, man cannot bring himself to the destination of felicity. And when revelation comes, it does not suppress reason, just as it does not suppress instinct, just as it does not destroy the outward senses. No; it comes to strengthen the outward senses, the human and mortal instincts, and the force of the intellect and thought of man; it refines them, purifies them, takes their hand, teaches them. This is the task of revelation. This, then, is the philosophy of prophethood. Because it is so — because we are deficient, because human knowledge and insight are not sufficient for our guidance — a hand must come out from the unseen and guide us. The place for a hand to come out from the unseen is here, not there where, when I have gone a little hungry, I do not go after a morsel of bread but wait for a hand to come out from the unseen. No — it is not for the place where, when I am confronted with a sin, I content myself with regret and sorrow and grief and wait for a hand to come out from the unseen for me; no — it is not for the place where I do not perform my divine duty, do not enjoin good, do not forbid evil, do not tread the path of God, and wait for a hand to come out from the unseen and do something — contrary to the verse of the Qur'an: Have you seen the one who denies the Religion? That is the one who drives away the orphan and does not urge the feeding of the needy. Of such deniers it is said: We were not among those who prayed, nor did we feed the needy. And we used to deny the Day of Judgment. The verse of the Qur'an counts among the deniers of religion those who do not incite the feeding of the destitute. They do not stir up and rouse the people to feeding the destitute and — with a broader, deeper view, and an interpretation closer to the very text of Islam — to uprooting poverty and hunger. That person who does not conform himself to this verse takes not a single step on the path of eliminating hungers, advances not a single pace on the path of destroying the root of poverty, and sits waiting for a hand to come out from the unseen and do something. Such people must know that if a hand were to come out from the unseen, it would first strike upon their own brains, to throw these spoiled and void existences away, to bring them down. There is such a thing as a hand coming out from the unseen and doing something — and this is exactly the point I made. For the guidance of man, it is necessary that a hand should come from the unseen, and that is the hand of the prophet, the hand of prophethood. That is the skill of the messengership, which comes and guides human beings in just the manner we have stated: to rouse the force of reason within them. Then several other matters arise here, several other matters are present here, of which I have briefly written down a list of some. One is this. What concept does prophethood have? What is its relation to the Bi'thah and being raised up (bar-angikhtagi)? We say the prophet was sent (mab'uth), was raised up; what does "raised up" mean? Is there a stirring (angizish) in prophethood? Is there a movement? This too is a discussion. In the discussions related to prophethood we do not encounter this discussion. What is the starting point of the work of the prophets? From where do they begin reform and aid to human beings? How is the conclusion of their endeavor? Where do their works arrive? Just this — that they laid him against a tree and sawed him, and it was finished and over? They cut off the head of Yahya before that tyrant (taghi), and it was finished and over? Is the end of the work of prophethood just this? No — another conclusion, another ending for this beginning is conceived and envisaged. It is alluded to in the Qur'an, and there are matters here which we will of course raise gradually, one by one, in the coming days, and set forth. Concerning the philosophy of prophethood, just this much that I have stated is, in my own view, sufficient. Of course, this was the briefest expression that could be set forth in this field. (You dear brothers listened well to this, God willing — for I see that you listen well — God willing the matter has been well grasped too. If anything in this field has not become clear to someone, here or there, he can ask me, or ask his neighbor at his side, so that this matter may become clear: what fundamentally is the philosophy of prophethood?) The verses that exist in this field are very pithy and very meaningful verses. My first thought was to explain in detail today this very verse that I am now reciting. Then I saw two obstacles. If I were to explain it, the matter about prophethood that I wished to say would remain unsaid, put off to tomorrow or the day after; and even then I cannot fully explain the meaning of this verse in this one hour. It is very interesting; of course I refer the good minds and thought of the friends to be sure to consult and look at this verse in the light of the Qur'an, for there is a relatively good discussion in that field there. I will content myself with only a brief translation. Mankind was one community (ummah). The people were all one ummah and one group. About this the commentators have an extensive discussion among themselves. Were they one ummah — a good ummah? Or were they one ummah — a bad ummah? On either supposition, the parties to the dispute raise an objection. Some say that "Mankind was one community" alludes to the primitive and initial communalism (ishtirakiyyat) of the prehistoric eras. I say that there is no evidence for this meaning, except that the name of the communalist and primitive era is on people's tongues, and we feel it a pity that our Qur'an too should have no share of that cloak — only that. Otherwise, "Mankind was one community" alludes to an era when human beings lived with the primitive and original communalism, as the gentlemen say, like — let me put it this way — animals, naked and bare and in herds, going about in the deserts and performing feats of strength, scraping stone with their claws and catching animals, eating them, and sometimes eating one another too. Should we take such a being, or ourselves, to be the referent in this verse "Mankind was one community"? No, no! We never attempt to attach something to our Qur'an from elsewhere. No; what we understand from our Qur'an, that is enough for us. If we understand it, we have done a great feat. Our Qur'an has no need that we should give it some marginal note or appendix from the sayings of others and the cultures of others, and exalt it thereby. No; the Qur'an does not want this kind of exaltation. "Mankind was one community" can be given several meanings. Two of its meanings are present in In the Light of the Qur'an, which you will now consult and observe; and a third meaning occurs to me, the one I alluded to in this translation. "Mankind was one community" means that human beings and people were all in an equal and identical state, in respect of needs and in respect of capacities. All human beings were of one kind of need, and all human beings had one measure of capacity — and the social reality is always like this. All human beings have reason, have thought, have intelligence, have a sixth sense, have outward senses, have inward senses. All human beings have hunger, have thirst, have sexual desire, want a house, want clothing, and the like. The needs are all equal, almost of one kind, and the capacities are similar. If one human being has been raised in a better upbringing, his capacity having blossomed, that is another matter. If some young nobleman has been born in an aristocratic house, with a private tutor at home teaching him at six or seven years of age to speak Indian and Chinese like a nightingale, while the child of some laborer in the kilns does not know even Persian properly at seven or eight years of age — that is another matter. This is no proof that this one's capacity was greater than that one's; no, this one's capacity was extracted, and the capacity of that poor one remained and was not extracted. The oil deposits that exist in regions — let us suppose northern, southern, in such-and-such a country — it is not certain that they are richer and more abundant than the oil deposits of some other point that has not been extracted. The oil of this one has been extracted; it comes into the lamps, its gasoline comes into the automobiles; everyone knows it too, its name is famous too. The oil of that one, poor thing, has not yet been extracted — it may even be richer. So human beings, naturally and ordinarily, were one community (ummah wahidah), with identical needs, with equal and similar capacities, which we have specified in the translation. So God sent the prophets (fa-ba'atha Llahu l-nabiyyin). Among these human beings of equal capacities, God the Exalted raised up the prophets. Among these of the same level, the Lord of the worlds singled out one human being — higher, stronger, deeper, more ardent, and of greater capacity — and raised him up. To do what? "as bearers of glad tidings" (mubashshirin) — bringers of good news — "and warners" (wa mundhirin) — and givers of warning. Of what do the prophets give glad tidings? They give the glad tidings of Paradise, they give the glad tidings of the felicity of this world, they give the glad tidings of the ideal city, they give the glad tidings of the establishment of security and peace and welfare, they give the glad tidings of the disappearance of poverty and despair and fear and insecurity and ignorance; they are bringers of glad tidings; and at last they give human beings the glad tidings of the establishment of a virtuous government and a righteous city, and after that the glad tidings of going to Paradise and connection to the good pleasure (ridwan) of the Lord — they give glad tidings. And they are warners; they frighten — they frighten of the fire of Hell too, they frighten of the narrowness of the bridge of Sirat too, they frighten of the wretchedness of this world too, they frighten of the domination of the demon of ignorance and poverty too, they frighten of the fall into the valley and the slope of corruption too, they frighten of the destruction of the human capacities too; they are bringers of warning, they are warners. So God sent the prophets as bearers of glad tidings and warners, and He sent down with them the Book with the truth (wa anzala ma'ahum al-kitaba bi-l-haqq). It is not all just that they should say "People, fear" and "People, glad tidings be to you." What do you have with you? A book from the side of the Lord. He sent down with them a book by the truth, in accordance with the truth. I have explained "the truth" (haqq) several times (now I can no longer explain it; I think that if I wished to explain "the truth" again, I would have to speak about that point alone for some ten or twelve minutes). In sum, that which conforms with the nature (fitrah) of the world, that which accompanies the natural course of the world — that is the truth. That which conforms with the nature of man and the disposition of the universe — that they call the truth. The book of the prophets too is the truth; it drives man forward on his natural path, on his innate course, on his ordinary bed and evolutionary course; it advances him, aids him. The book of the prophets carries the truth with it. He sent down with them the Book with the truth, that it might judge among the people concerning that wherein they differed (li-yahkuma bayna l-nasi fima ikhtalafu fihi). Until that book — "that it might judge" (li-yahkuma); that is, until the book judges among the people, in those things about which they differ with one another. After all, people are not free of difference; differences among human beings are a custom (sunnah), and their existence is necessary, and their absence is harmful. Know this: the existence of difference is good, because difference is a cause of evolution. But that other thing I said — that the absence of difference is harmful — on this I must reconsider; I do not know whether it is harmful or not. At any rate, I would have to elaborate and interpret. Its existence is beneficial; as for "its absence is harmful," I do not know — I take that statement back. The book comes to judge among the people, to render judgment, to rule, concerning the things about which they have differed. What do we understand here? We understand that the government which the prophets bring into being is not the government of the individual prophet, the government of a person, the government of despotism; rather, it is the government of law, the government of the Book. When the prophet comes, he makes a society in which the ruler in that society, in meaning and in reality, is that very book — that is, the law. that it might judge among the people concerning that wherein they differed. And none differed concerning it except those who were given it (wa ma ikhtalafa fihi illa lladhina utuhu). Concerning this book no difference arose; they did not differ — "except those who were given it," except those people to whom the book had been given, those people for whom this very heavenly book came; they themselves differed concerning the heavenly book. What does this show us? It shows the existence of distortion (tahrif) in the heavenly religions, among the sayings of the prophets. When the prophets came, they brought the book, the law, the school; then those very people to whom this book and law and school had been given differed about it. They differed — meaning what? Meaning that one type spoke the truth, and one type spoke contrary to fact. So therefore there are those who are followers of a religion and who speak the word of religion, but speak contrary to fact — an allusion to the existence of abrogation (naskh) and distortion (tahrif) in the religions. after the clear proofs had come to them, out of mutual envy (min ba'di ma ja'athumu l-bayyinatu baghyan baynahum). Out of enmity and transgression with one another. Then God guided those who believed to the truth concerning that wherein they differed, by His leave (fa-hada Llahu lladhina amanu lima ikhtalafu fihi mina l-haqqi bi-idhnih). Those people who are believers, who have inclined to the true religion — God guided them to the answer to that wherein they had differed, by His leave and permission. And God guides whom He wills to a straight path (wa Llahu yahdi man yasha'u ila siratin mustaqim). And God guides whomever He wills to the straight path. (This is one portion of today's recitation, about which it seems it was necessary that I should speak more, in these last words of it — except that I now feel I have grown very tired, such that I will content myself with the verses of Surat al-Jumu'ah too in just the translation that is in your hands, and will not explain them further.) Let those who have a Qur'an with them bring Surat al-Jumu'ah, in the twenty-eighth part (juz'): In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate. Whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth glorifies God, the Sovereign, the Holy, the Mighty, the Wise. This is Surat al-Jumu'ah, up to "and God is the possessor of mighty bounty" (wa Llahu dhu l-fadli l-'azim). (Of course, I have explained this surah several times up to now, both here and in that mosque, on various occasions. On Thursday nights we usually recite it in the maghrib prayer, so that the believers and friends who participate in that prayer may know its meaning — and on this account I have given a brief commentary on Surat al-Jumu'ah more than once. It may well be that many of you gentlemen present here have heard that commentary from me. Besides that, I am now tired. And as for the translation, I have done it: in these very papers that are in your hands the translation has been written — this much, in our view, is sufficient for now.) So what have we understood up to now? We have understood the philosophy of prophethood, and that this is a principle in all religions — indeed, the mother principle. Without it, religion can have no correct meaning or concept, because religion is that thing which comes from the side of the Lord, by way of a messenger, a bearer of revelation.