Ep 11 — Tawhid in Islamic Ideology artwork

Episode

Ep 11 — Tawhid in Islamic Ideology

Jul 14, 2026 · Episode 11 · 43:33

0:0043:33

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Session 9: Tawhid in Islamic Ideology. delivered Friday, 5 Mehr 1353 / 10 Ramadan al-Mubarak 1394 Surat al-Baqarah (2:165). And among mankind are some who take, besides God, rivals [whom] they love as they should love God. But those who believe are stronger in love for God. If only those who do wrong could see — when they behold the punishment — that all power belongs to God, and that God is severe in punishment. The theist says that beyond what we see, there is a reality higher and more magnificent than what we observe, and that were it not for that reality, these phenomena would never have taken form. The materialist says: no; we cannot believe in, or commit ourselves to, anything other than what we see. In our laboratories and experiments, however much we have searched, we have found no sign and no trace of this being you speak of. Let the dispute between the materialist and the theist remain for the books and discussions devoted specifically to that subject. Here is our belief about the materialists of our age. (We are not concerned with Democritus of history, that other materialist atheist of ten centuries ago, Democritus or some such scholar who lived twenty centuries, thirty centuries ago. We have no quarrel with him; he died, and even his bones have turned to dust.) The materialist of our time, if he says there is no God, if he believes that beyond this world no other reality exists, in truth says it because he has suffered an intellectual and spiritual disillusionment with the school of theism. Because he believes that the building of today's world, the administration of human beings, the establishment of justice, and the removal of discrimination are impossible except in the shadow of a materialist, materialistic mode of thought — for this reason he turns his back on the school of the theists. If we look carefully at the intellectual condition of those who, over the last fifty or sixty years, have embraced some of the "isms" of our time, if we study it properly, we will find that the matter is exactly as we have said. It is not that they bear some obstinate grudge against God, nor that they reject or refuse to accept God because they lack a convincing rational argument for His existence. Most often there is no rational argument on the other side of the question either; there is no argument for negating God — none at all, neither now nor in the past. You will not find a single person who says, "I say there is no God for this reason" — not one! Among all the materialists of the world, from the first day until now, there is not one who says, "I prove there is no God by this argument." Anyone who has something to say on this matter says, "It has not been proven to me that He exists; I did not understand, I did not accept the argument for His existence." And the Qur'an points to precisely this fact: They are following nothing but conjecture. They merely chase after fancy and guesswork; otherwise they cannot negate God with any proof. So it is not on account of not having a rationally satisfying philosophy, nor is there a rationally satisfying philosophy on the materialist side either. In the case of the materialist of our age — and this is a subtle point — what draws him toward what he calls the materialist school is that he imagines this school can better administer the world today. He says it can better eliminate oppression, better destroy discrimination and inequality, better uproot, dissolve, and annihilate tyranny and despotism. He says religion cannot do these things. Why does he say so? Because of religion — of the common, prevalent notion of religion — he knows nothing except what he has observed in the hands of the people of the street and bazaar, in its traditional and imitative form. In short, he has no knowledge of religion, no information about it. If you ask him what religion is, he names a series of outward manifestations and says, "This is religion." And then comes his verdict: these are an opiate, these are the brother and equal of oppression and the oppressor, these cannot loosen a single knot in the people's tangled affairs, therefore — abandon it. When a person is faced with such a logic, the best and most correct answer is plain. Yes — if you have found a religion that colludes with the oppressor, that cooperates with the despot, that does not stand for one moment alongside the oppressed, that does not untie one knot in the people's tangled affairs, that has not the worth of a poppy seed, of a mustard's atom, for the people's today and tomorrow — then on our behalf you are authorized: wherever you found such a religion, reject it, do not accept it for a single moment. Because if a religion is from God, it is not like this. A religion that God sends is not just anything; it has a sign, it has a distinguishing mark, it bears a standard seal. If this standard seal matches a given religion, we accept it; if it does not match, we do not accept it. (When I speak about prophethood and the Prophet — God willing, in the series of Quranic discussions — perhaps I will convey this meaning there in greater detail.) The Qur'an says: We have certainly sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and We sent down with them the Book and the Balance, so that the people may uphold justice. "We sent Our messengers with clear proofs" — We sent forth Our prophets with luminous proofs, "and We sent down with them" a body of thought and the practical instruments — instruments by which they could judge and adjudicate among the people in their disputes — toward the people. Why did We do these things? "We sent" — not just one prophet, not just Moses, not just the Seal of the Prophets, not just Jesus; "We sent Our messengers" — all the prophets were sent with this one purpose and this one aim. What is that aim? "So that the people may uphold justice" — so that human beings may live on the basis of equity, justice, and fairness. This is religion. If you have seen a religion moving in the opposite direction to the philosophy of the religions, know that it is either not divine or it has been corrupted. If you have seen it moving contrary to the philosophy and the line of march of the divine prophets and the divine messengers, know with certainty that it is not the offspring of the Lord's revelation and of the prophets. This is quite clear. So, O materialist! — the address is to them — O materialist! O you who say, "I have seen religion to be incapable of administering human societies" — we ask: which religion? The religion of Islam? True Islam? The Muhammadan revelation? The sovereign Alawid way of life? Have you seen these to be incompatible with the administration of human affairs? Come, prove it; where is the incompatibility? An Islam that comes and removes discrimination, that negates class division in the very heat of the world's class division, that pours together the wealth that has been unjustly distributed and redistributes it per capita, that gives human beings equal opportunities and means, that takes governance out of the hands of human tyrants and entrusts it to the just law of God; that honors the base human being, the human being who is slapped about, the enslaver and the enslaved, the human being who — for the sake of a single word, for the sake of a single bravo, for the sake of a single worthless coin — would commit the basest of crimes; that elevates this base, abject, despised human being, raises him up, makes him noble, adorns him with moral and human virtues — and secures all of this in the shadow of a just and firmly grounded order. Nor is the prophet's training a matter of individual cultivation — taking each person one by one by the hand and seating him in a corner of a private chamber, whispering incantations into his ear so that he may become upright, so that he may become a true human being; it is not like that either. Nor is it preaching, with the prophet sitting and preaching to the people — "people, this is bad, do it that way." It is a social order. The prophet, in the ignorant atmosphere of that day, cast the foundation of Islamic society as firm as steel, in a determinate shape and mold. Then he brought human beings into this mold, brought human beings into this path and this channel. And bringing them into this path was itself their becoming true human beings; the two were one. So if you say that the Islamic religion — which is the truly Islamic religion, with these characteristics — if you say it this way, that it is not on a par with human progress, with justice, with the establishment of security, and with the meeting of human needs — no; we do not accept this, this is unfairness, this is unfairness. If a scholar who grew up in the hollow milieu of Christianity, who has seen of religious manifestations nothing but the false intercessions of Christ, the forgiveness of sins, and the selling of deeds of paradise for money — if he gave himself the right to say this about religion, you, who live a hundred years, eighty years, fifty years after him, and who live in an era in which Islam is more or less showing itself, and has displayed and is displaying the sweetest and most precious human manifestations on the horizon of the world — you have no right to say this. If this is your meaning — no, this is not correct. But if you say: the hollow religions, the false religions, the fair-faced and foul-hearted religions, the religions that everywhere drag the people into lethargies and submissions to oppression and pessimisms and divisions and fratricides; the religion that says to the poor, "If you have no wealth, if you have no money, you need not strive in the way of money," and says to the rich, "In return for what you have, give a portion to the church or to some other religious institution, and it will be the atonement for all the oppressions you committed in the course of acquiring this money" — if you mean this religion, in this we too are of one voice with you, and both of us are followers of the Qur'an: O you who believe, indeed many of the rabbis and monks devour the wealth of people unjustly and avert [them\ from the way of God.] O you who have believed, many of the Jewish and Christian scholars and ascetics devour the wealth of people without entitlement — "they devour" — and they do not even content themselves with that; "and they avert [them] from the way of God" — they also bar the people's path toward perfection and elevation. Would that they took their money and devoured it but left their path open! He devours their money and he severs their path. This the Qur'an says. We too are of one voice with you: a religion that is like that is not religion. A religion that is like that — any irreligion is better than it; because the irreligions may at least sometimes not become accomplices to oppressions and injustices, whereas such a religion may possibly become a means, a staff, a weapon in their hands. Well, in summary, this was a set of generalities about the belief in Tawhid — taken as a vision, as the answer to a single question: is there a God or is there not? Is there anything beyond this material world? Is there a hand of power or not? In answering it I said that the theist speaks this way and the materialist speaks that way. Set aside the war of theist and materialist and leave it for the books; what little of it pertained to us, we have said in a word or two. Now, a very important point. (If today I am unable to say everything I have written here, that is no obstacle, because this discussion will be continued — God willing, we will be with you tomorrow as well, if God wills. These matters which, as a preliminary and as the generalities of the subject, everyone must know — those I must state. Because it is Friday, some of you gentlemen may have been able to come today and may not be able to come tomorrow.) There are certain matters that are necessary for everyone in the domain of Islamic thought; everyone must know these, everyone must understand them. One of them is this: I say, gentlemen, when you raise the question of Tawhid, do not raise it as a dry, simple answer to a scientific and cerebral question; rather, raise it as a matter whose knowing or not-knowing is vital, decisive — raise it that way. Now I will explain. Suppose at one time you are going along some road; with a friend, with a fellow-traveler and companion, you are moving and going along a road, and a discussion arises between you. You say, "Sir, the lands on both sides of this road are, in my view, salt-marsh; no crop at all can be obtained here." He says, "No, sir, the lands on both sides of this road are, in fact, perfectly suited for the cultivation of such-and-such." You say something, he says something; you offer a proof, he offers a proof. Well, how important is this discussion? You are going on, after all. The gentlemen's automobile is passing along this road at a hundred and twenty. You are not now going to sit down and test its soil, nor are you going to buy a piece of these lands so as to come back later and grow beets, nor are you going to answer some testimony or inquiry made about these lands; this question and answer has no effect for you whatsoever. Just this much: it is an answer to a question, a reply in the face of some matter that has been raised, and nothing more — nothing else at all. Whether you said and proved that this soil is barren and yields nothing, or he proved that no, on the contrary, excellent and remarkable beets come up and grow green here — whichever of you proves his claim, your road, your work, your present motion undergoes no change. It is not that, if it is proven to be barren, you say, "Well, now that it is barren, let us turn back"; no — you had no business with this place. Or if it is proven that this place is fertile, you say, "Very well, now that it is fertile, come, let us pray two units of prayer at the foot of this fertile land"; no — it has no effect at all. Whether you prevail and prove your claim, or he prevails and proves his claim, it has no kind of effect on your motion, on this journey you are making, on your future, on your companionship — on anything. This is one kind of discussion, one kind of question, one kind of answer to a question. At another time it happens that the two of you are seated in the car, this same car at this same speed is moving along this same road, and suddenly your friend says, "In my view, this road we are traveling reaches the north — whereas your destination is the south." You say, "No, sir, this road we are traveling reaches the south." He says no, you say no; this discussion flares up between the two of you. If he proves his claim, the head of the car must be turned around, you must go from the other direction — you had no business this way. If you prove your claim, with the very same course, the very same method, only a bit faster, you must take your road and go forward. Right now this hesitation that has arisen between you, and the two opinions that have appeared — its first effect is that the driver's foot goes to the brake, easing off a little: "Let us see now where we are going; in the end will we reach the destination or not?" This is called a question-and-answer and a discussion whose answer and whose result are decisive. The discussion of Tawhid is like this. The way ordinary, common people, or the socially idle and the irresponsible and uncommitted, raise the question of Tawhid is different from the way a committed person ought to have the question of Tawhid raised for him. An uncommitted, irresponsible person raises Tawhid this way: is there a God or is there not? Well, now if there is, what shall we do? If there is not, what shall we do? What effect does it have on the condition of life, what change or alteration does it create in the social order? If there were a God, what would happen to the capitalist system of such-and-such a great power or such-and-such a superpower? A president who comes to power in a certain country — if he believed there is a God, how would he act? If he believed there is no God, how would he act? Does it make any difference at all? A knowledge of God and a worship of God in which the acceptance of one side leaves no difference and no effect upon the fate of cartels and trusts and capitalisms and discriminations — that worship of God, that belief in Tawhid, is like the belief in the fertility of this land we are passing by; it has no benefit, no effect, for us. What benefit is it that some political leader of a certain country believes in God, while for him the worship of God is merely an answer to a dry, cerebral question and nothing higher? Being a worshiper of God, being a monotheist — then is it important, effective, beneficial, necessary, vital for a political leader, for an ordinary person, for a society, for a nation, for a community and a group — when Tawhid is raised, understood, and grasped for the sake of its effects, for the sake of what follows from it, for the sake of the order it proposes, for the sake of the form of life it presents — for the sake of these things of it. In our view this is a very important matter. It comes into our imagination that Tawhid is something we need only clarify in our heads, establish as settled; and that when we come to life, this Tawhid no longer has any effect in life; and if it does have an effect, it is in personal life, not in social life. "Even if I am a monotheist, I will have the same capital and the same automobile and the same company and the same factory and the same condition of relationship with the worker and the same condition of relationship with the land as I would have had if I were not a monotheist." Look at the capitalist countries of the world, at these enormous powers whose name and fame have filled East and West: take two capitalists, two great merchants, two great factory-owners, two of these "sultans of industry," as they call themselves; suppose one believes in God and one is a materialist — what difference is there in their conduct? Now, if the one who believes in God went to church on Sunday and gave a few coppers to the monk there to forgive him some of his sins, to smooth and level out a few kilometers of the road to paradise for him — but what is its effect in his life? In the condition of his factory? In his relations with the worker? In his relations with the people? In the manner of his wealth-accumulation, in his spending of wealth, in his amassing of wealth, what effect does it have? This Tawhid is not much different from polytheism. The Tawhid to which Islam summons is a Tawhid higher than the level of an answer to a question, to an inquiry. So what is it? Islamic Tawhid is an inspiration in the domain of governance, in the domain of social relations, in the domain of the course of society, in the domain of the aims of society, in the domain of the people's duties, in the domain of the responsibilities that human beings bear before God, before one another, before society, and before the other phenomena of the world. This is Tawhid. Islamic Tawhid is that same "alif" after which come "be" and "pe" and "che," all the way to "ye." It is not that you say, "God is one and not two," and the matter is finished. "God is one and not two" means that, in the entire region of your own existence — you individually and your society as a whole — no one but God has the right to rule. "God is one and not two" means that all the wealth you possess — you and all other human beings — belongs to God; you are no more than borrowers and trustees. Who now is ready to become a monotheist? You hold the money in trust and that is all; you are a borrower. If, sir, some money of your friend's were deposited in your hand as a trust, what would you do? You wait for him to give the order. "Sir, give ten tomans of this money to that child, to that old man, to that stranger, to that relative; throw ten tomans of this money into such-and-such a fund; burn ten tomans of it altogether" — you wait for the handwriting of the owner of the money, do you not? Is it other than this? Do you regard yourself as having any right, any ownership, in this money held in trust and deposit? "Wealth is the wealth of God; He has placed it as deposits among the people." — God has entrusted wealth as a deposit and trust into the hands of human beings. This is the corollary of Tawhid. If you hold to Tawhid, then class division and discrimination in society have no meaning — no meaning at all. The society that has a top and a bottom, that has an upper and a lower, that society is not a Tawhidi society. Tawhid says, "All of you are from Adam, and Adam is from dust" — all are the children of Adam, and Adam is from dust. Your nearness to God and your superiority lie in piety, and nothing else; whoever is more mindful of God's command, he is the higher. Otherwise, in a society in which there exist a thousand grounds for discrimination — you say, "Sir, so-and-so is like this," and the reply comes, "Well, so-and-so is among the nobility, he has a different reckoning" — in a society that has nobles and non-nobles, in a society in which the people's enjoyments differ severely from one another and the privileged one regards it as his right; in a society in which the servants of God are not all on one level and some are still servants of others — in this society there is no Tawhid. When Tawhid comes to a society, all the servants are placed on one level. Meaning what? Meaning that all become servants of God — as I said yesterday. (On this sheet which relates to yesterday, we wrote this sentence.) The beings of the world, human and otherwise, are His subjugated servants, and in servitude to Him all are partners and equals. This I explained in detail yesterday — that no one and no thing, under the heading of sonship, spousehood, or peerage, is outside the circle of servitude to God. Within the domain of servitude, it no longer has any meaning that one group of servants should again bind a chain around the necks of another group; that has no meaning at all. Servitude to God means freedom from servitude to other-than-God; the two simply do not go together. It has no meaning that someone should be a servant of God and also a servant of other-than-God. Servitude to God means freedom from servitude to, and from the worship of, whatever is other-than-God and whoever is other-than-God. The envoy of the armies of Islam came and entered the powerful palace of the Sasanians. A ragged-clothed Arab — an Arab whose whole attire, if you reckon it up, was perhaps not worth one of our tomans — entered the palace of the man who, on the day he was fleeing while the valiant Muslim warriors pursued him, had brought along with him a thousand singing slave-girls only, apart from other things. His minstrels and singers numbered a thousand. If this is how it is at home, what must it be on a journey — and a journey of flight at that, a journey on which he is fleeing in fear of his life? Wretch! Where are you taking singers? Take a sword with you. One fears they too were under the colonialism of the Jews! (Laughter from the audience.) — It is among the characteristics of the sinister, vile Zionist policies that they keep the people occupied with these very dilly-dallyings and song-singings and song-listenings, under various names — this ragged-clothed man entered the court of such an enormous political power. Do you think he was afraid? Do you think he was overawed? Do you think he came with thoughts of disputation? Never. After all, when a paltry, small person presents himself before a powerful and exalted personage, his whole effort is to attach himself even a particle to that great power, to draw himself a little closer — even by flattery, by fawning, by displaying fear, by displaying servitude and submission. Do you think it was like that? Never. When he went forward and reached before the throne, it seems he even set his foot upon Yazdgird's throne, because he saw that Yazdgird would not come to take the paper from him. He had brought a paper, brought a message; others came to take it, and he said, "I will not give it to you; I must give it to him himself." And since the latter would not rise from his place to come and take the paper from this Arab, this one was forced to go forward. He went, and when he reached upon his throne he gave him the paper, so to speak. He said, "For what have you come?" He spoke three sentences — three sentences that ought to be written in radiant letters and pounded onto a tablet over the gateway of the great palace of humanity, so that all may know what the slogan of Islam and the idea of Islam is. He said, "Why have you come?" He said, "We have come" — within the course of his speech, of course; these three sentences of his are what concern us. "We have come to bring the people out" — A saying is related: "Li-nukhrija al-nasa min 'ibadat al-'ibadi ila 'ibadat Allah" — "We have come to bring human beings out from the servitude of [created] servants to the servitude of God Most High." What is the servitude of [created] servants? Take an example. In one of the campaigns between Iran and Rome, one of the past kings of Iran — before the Sasanians, from the Achaemenids — gives the order for all to come. An old man comes and says, "Sir, my three sons are coming, they are with you in the field; let this one son of mine stay beside me, for I am old, I am decrepit; allow this one to remain and not come with you." In the assembly they say nothing to him; they drive him out of the assembly. Then the next day, when the troops are moving in columns of four, the horses and soldiers behind one another, as they reach the gateway, those three brothers suddenly see their fourth brother cut into two pieces, one piece installed on this side of the gate and one piece on that side of the gate — so that old men will no longer say, "Let our young men not come, and let them not fight for the power of Darius," and will not throw themselves into water and fire. This is the servitude of man. When human beings in a society did not even have the right to want what they want — I do not say to say it; when human beings in a community had no right to be partisans and seekers of justice, to be enemies of discrimination; when human beings had no right to love and want freedom for themselves, but accepted suffocation and strangulation as the natural condition and set their seal of approval upon it — when human beings lived in such a society, this is the highest and ugliest and bitterest of the kinds of servitude. This is the worst of the kinds of servitude. Why? Because it is fraudulent. Those who used to go and seize a handful of innocent human beings in some place, shave their heads, and sell them in other lands — they performed an open and overt act; but to play with human beings in this way, to disregard a human being's thought and want and will and decision in this way, to trample him — this was it. He said, "We have come to free you from the worship of [created] servants" — that is, to free the people from the worship of you, O Yazdgird! to free others from the worship of your governors, your village-heads, your commanders, here and there — "min 'ibadat al-'ibad." Then where shall we take them? They were not your servants, so what shall they be? Loose and lawless? No — they shall be servants of God. To be a servant of God means to be free, to be a master, to move toward perfection, to use and benefit from the means of perfection to whatever extent you wish — just as it was in the Islamic society. In the Islamic society, the people were servants of God, not servants of powers. Even at the time when the course of the Islamic society had deviated and was not a hundred percent Islam, it was so. Even in those very years when the conquest of Iran was taking place, the effect of the prophetic and Quranic upbringing was present in the people. A political ruler says from the pulpit, "If I become crooked, set me straight," and a desert Arab rises from the foot of the pulpit and says, "If you do not become straight and you become crooked, with this sword we will set you straight." Did the soldiers and police fall upon his head? Did they throw him into prison as one creating disorder in the situation, did they do away with him, destroy him? Never. He had said something true, he had said something logical. Freedom not in the sense of unbridled license, but freedom in the sense of obedience to a sound human law — so that, in the spirit of man, in that order and in that society, a human being does not carry anyone's burden on his shoulders, not even the ruler's burden. If the ruler spoke from God, spoke by the inspiration of God, he is an Islamic ruler, and his word is accepted. If he did not speak by divine inspiration, his word too is rejected. A saying is related: "Li-nukhrija al-nasa min 'ibadat al-'ibad ila 'ibadat Allah, wa min diq al-dunya ila sa'at al-dunya wa al-akhirah" — The second sentence. He said, "We have come to bring the people, the servants of God, out from the limited and narrow enclosure of the world into the breadth of the world and the hereafter." The limited and narrow enclosure of the world! In a society in which the people do not live with a sound vision, from whichever side they look, before their gaze there is nothing but the world and its worldly gains; from whichever side the people look, nothing is at issue for them except worldly pleasures and the self-conceits of the world; whatever he looks at, he sees his own small and worthless animal endeavors and his small, base, paltry, fleeting, and momentary interests. In a society over which Yazdgird ruled, it was not that all the people were content with Yazdgird; there were also many discontented. But because the eyes of these discontented were near-sighted, because the horizon of their vision was narrow and small, they saw that if they showed the slightest discontent and displeasure with Yazdgird, this very meager, base life would also be taken from them — these two extra mouthfuls of food, these two extra days of repose, these two extra kicks in the alley and the street, this would be taken from him; and because he set great store by this, because he loved this very meagerness so much, he was not ready to undertake any action for freedom, for human honor and authenticity and virtue. What was the cause? His horizon of vision was small, narrow, and limited — the narrowness of the world. But when a human being became a Muslim, everything is for him a preliminary, a means. For what? A means to what? A means of reaching a vast world — I do not mean the world after death — the world of man's own thought, vision, and sight, which is as wide and expansive as God. Everything is a means for man, so that man may be able to gain the pleasure of God. The life of the world, the money of the world, the comfort of the world, the affections of the world have no value and authenticity for him. It acquires value for him only A saying is related: "fi sabil Allah" — when it is in the way of God. But if this affection, this wealth, this rank, this life, this child, this honor, this dignity were not, and were not placed, in the way of God and in the way of duty, then it has no price and no value for him. The world and the hereafter are sewn together in the Islamic mode of thought; and for a Muslim, the world has no end. In the view of that person who is the servant of servants and the slave of deficient beings, the world is limited; but for this one, the world is vast. Death is a small window: when you look from this window, on the other side are gardens and orchards and worlds and universes and realms; therefore he sees that the most that can happen is that he reaches this window, passes through this window — it does not matter; death is no problem for him. These are some glimmers and corners of Tawhid. Of course, about Tawhid one must speak much more systematically and under a more definite heading, and we will speak — God willing — in the days ahead. Today I only wanted to have stated some generalities in this regard. (What has been written on the first page — which, of course, I will not repeat — is in fine handwriting and the gentlemen can read it.) This in truth presents a new vision in the domain of Tawhid. It states a correct vision in the domain of Tawhid. Of course there are further aspects and angles that have not come into this, and which — God willing — I hope we can arrange in due order in the writings of the coming days. But in any case, what has been written here is one dimension of Tawhid that reflects and states precisely what is intended in the domain of Tawhid, what is intended by the religions and the Qur'an in particular. And now, the verses we have selected. (Of course, today — well, it is Friday and you have not much to do; after I have read these verses here, our dear reciter, apparently Mr. Rezaei or Mr. Fatemi — the gentlemen themselves know better, in any case — are responsible for today's recitation; they will come and read the verses, both these verses and yesterday's verses, that is, especially Ayat al-Kursi.) The repetition of Ayat al-Kursi as a slogan of Tawhid is very interesting. I conjecture that the reason it has been so strongly emphasized that Ayat al-Kursi be recited repeatedly in various instances is that this slogan of Tawhid should always be living and enduring in a person's mind, ever-alive and self-subsisting — this memory in a person's mind. These verses written here today are from Surat al-Baqarah. It is the description of a scene at the Resurrection, which, of course, has a complete and total connection to the matter of Tawhid; and in the course of the recitation of the verse it becomes entirely clear. Surat al-Baqarah, verses 165 and 166. And among mankind are some who take, besides God, rivals… Among the people are some who choose, besides God, rivals and competitors; that is, they choose for God a partner of the human kind or of other than the human kind. "Yuhibbunahum ka-hubb Allah" — they love them like the love and affection one ought to have for God. Right here the verse opens a parenthesis; for it was not speaking about love, but since the love of these toward God was mentioned, it opens a parenthesis, as if — A saying is related: "Wa alladhina amanu ashaddu hubban li-Llah" — But those who have believed, the true and real believers — their love and affection toward God is far more intense than all these outward manifestations, than all the poles that draw the human heart toward themselves like amber, than all the false gods, than the god of the self and lust; and so on, take it all the way up to those gods who have seated themselves, and are seated, and are given a seat, at the head and summit of societies — than all of these, God is more beloved to the believer. A saying is related: "Wa alladhina amanu ashaddu hubban li-Llah, wa law yara alladhina zalamu idh yarawna al-'adhab…" Suddenly it transfers the discourse to a scene of the Resurrection. It describes that moment when the creatures have been gathered, mustered together at the Resurrection — the disbelievers and the evildoers and the servants of other-than-God and the servants of God and all the existing phenomena of the Resurrection, those that have been described to us and those that have not — all are gathered. The instruments of God's punishment and the instruments of God's mercy and grace are there too; though as to the quality of these instruments, you and I cannot yet rightly grasp or imagine — in this world it cannot rightly be understood what news there is there. In general we know only this much: that the means that are to be foreseen there for torment, for punishment, for wretchedness are all present and prepared. The good servants of God and the bad servants of God are there; then the tyrants and the oppressors suddenly see that all power at the Resurrection belongs to God. It is a very strange thing. Now, in this world, look: everyone has some power, everyone does something. Those who sit on high have more power, but those who sit below also have power, after all. Everyone prides himself on his own power; everyone has some measure and substance of capacity and force within him; something does come from him, after all — especially that tyrant, that oppressor, whose deed is greater, whose power too is greater. And even that oppressor who performed the worship of an oppressor — for he too is an oppressor, he too is a tyrant — he too, in his own imagination, enjoys some power; because he has connected himself with a higher power, like a fox that has tied its tail to a camel's tail. In the world it is like this. But at the Resurrection, when they gather, whatever they look at, whoever refers back to himself, he sees that there is no power, no capacity, no competence in him; power is entirely in the hand of God. "Li-man al-mulku al-yawm? Li-Llah al-wahid al-qahhar" — Whose is the sovereignty this day? It belongs to God, the One, the Subduer. He takes this scene into view: that tyrant, that oppressor, says — whatever oppressor who oppressed others, whatever oppressor who oppressed himself and had made himself the servant of that first oppressor — when they look, when they see, "Strange! Here all those words and claims and airs and pomps and palaces and lives are all nothing and void; nothing at all comes from anyone's hand." Then the scene there is a strange scene. Take two groups into view: one group worshiped the other group — that is, obeyed them, with unconditional obedience. These two groups stand face to face on the Day of Resurrection; they have war and dispute and quarrel with one another. A saying is related: "Wa law yara alladhina zalamu idh yarawna al-'adhab" — If only those who have done wrong could see — in the parenthesis we explained, we specified this wrongdoing as surrendering oneself to other-than-God. In this explanation we followed some of the old Shi'i commentators. — If only those who have done wrong by surrendering themselves to other-than-God could see, when they behold the punishment — what would they see? A saying is related: "Anna al-quwwata li-Llahi jami'an" — that all force and power are entirely from God; "wa anna Allaha shadid al-'adhab" — and that God's chastisement is severe and terrible. If they could see, what would happen? The answer is decreed. In the parenthesis we mentioned its answer in Persian: they would, without doubt, regret their own conduct. They would regret that in the world they had clutched at such a thing — they went and became the servants and slaves of tyrants who are now, at the Resurrection, so incapable, from whose hands so little comes. If they had looked with the eye of admonition, they would have seen that in the world too they were just as incapable. "Idh tabarra'a alladhina uttubi'u min alladhina ittaba'u wa ra'awu al-'adhab" — At that time when the leaders and chiefs disavow the followers and adherents, and they behold the punishment of God. Then Yazdgird, for example, says, "O Lord! O my Sustainer! These ones whom you saw worshiping me in my time — I disavow these ones, do not imagine that I have any attachment to them for setting me up as your partner; they did wrong to set me as your partner, I disavow them." Now see how much the subjects of Yazdgird's day burn within: "We gave him our world and our hereafter, this scoundrel, and now at the Resurrection he disavows us." Now what does this verse of the Qur'an say? "Idh tabarra'a alladhina uttubi'u min alladhina ittaba'u wa ra'awu al-'adhab" — At that time when the leaders and chiefs disavow the followers and adherents and behold the punishment of God; "wa taqatta'at bihim al-asbab" — and the ties and bonds between them are severed; "wa qala alladhina ittaba'u" — and the followers and adherents say, "law anna lana karratan fa-natabarra'a minhum kama tabarra'u minna" — "Would that we had a return to the world, so that we might disavow them just as they disavowed us" — that is, today, the Day of Resurrection. "Kadhalika yurihimu Allahu a'malahum hasaratin 'alayhim" — Thus does God show them their deeds as a cause of regret upon them; "wa ma hum bi-kharijina min al-nar" — and they will never be those who come out of the Fire. Here is what the verse intends. Those people there are receiving blows — they receive the blows of servitude to other-than-God; they receive the blow of having become the servants and slaves of other-than-God; that is, of something other than Tawhid and against Tawhid. And the Qur'an's own expression for them is "ittaba'u," the adherents, the followers.

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